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THE DILEMMA OF CHOICE: A
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE ON THE
LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRA CT
By GILLIAN K. HADFIELD*
In this essay I explore what Michael Trebilcock's work
in The Limits of Freedom of Contract offers feminists in
terms of a resolution or transcendance of the dilemma
of choice. Trebilcock's work does not address the
deepest feminist concerns about conflicts between
autonomy and welfare, but it does shed light on
narrower versions of the dilemma, providing an
analytical framework for the feminist dilemma of
choice and emphasizing the pervasiveness of this
problem in contract law. Trebilcock's recommendation
that society simultaneously use different institutions to
promote different values also has salience for the
feminist dilemma of choice.
Dans cet essai j'examine le travail de Michael
Trebilcock intitul6 The Limits of Freedom of Contract
pour voir ce que l'oeuvre presente aux f6ministes
comme la resolution ou la transcendance du dilemme
de choix. Le travail de Trebilcock ne souligne pas les
prdoccupations f6ministes les plus profondes en ce qui
concerne les conflits entre l'autonomie et le bien-6tre,
mais l'oeuvre 6claircit des versions plus 6troites du
dilemme, tout en crdant un cadre analytique pour le
dilemme de choix f~ministe et en mettant l'accent surle
caract~re p6n6trant de cc probl6me en droit des
contrats. La recommandation de Trebilcock, selon
laquelle la societ6 se sert simultanement des
institutions differentes, est aussi saillante pour le
dilemme de choixfeministe.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The concepts that animate Michael Trebilcock's The Limits of
Freedom of Contract inspire deep ambivalence in feminists. Autonomy,
choice, contract, and, above all, the market, raise for feminists difficult
conflicts between the drive to overcome the historical subjugation that
has deprived women of autonomy and choice on the one hand, and the
conviction, on the other, that the institutions of contract law and the
market offer predominantly impoverished and ultimately degrading
opportunities for choice by women already trapped in patriarchy.
Among many feminists there is a suspicion, even a fear, that autonomy
and choice through contract and the market are traps that will only
further ensnare women in disadvantage and degradation.
Feminists struggle with the dilemma of choice, in part, because
of an overarching concern about the paradigm of the "rational economic
man" and the atomistic conception of liberal individualism. According
to feminist scholar Virginia Held,
[t]o see contractual relations between self-interested or mutually disinterested individuals
as constituting a paradigm of human relations is to take a certain historically specific
conception of 'economic man' as representative of humanity. And it is, many feminists
are beginning to agree, to overlook or to discount in very fundamental ways the
experience of women.1
Jennifer Nedelsky has argued that "claims about the market as a suitable
or even crucial vehicle for the exercise of autonomy proceed without
inquiry into what actually makes human autonomy possible."2 "What
makes autonomy possible is not separation, but relationship. ... The
collective is a source of autonomy as well as a threat to it." These
criticisms of the traditional liberal institutions of choice and concepts of
autonomy evidence the deep roots of the dilemma of choice.
In addition to these deeply rooted concerns about choice,
however, feminists also struggle with the immediate consequences of
choice for women in those settings that may lead to women being
directly and materially harmed, as existing imbalances of economic,
social, and political power find yet another instrument of expression. In
this essay, I want to explore what Michael Trebilcock's work in The
1 "Non-contractual Society: A Feminist View" in M. Hanen & K. Nelson, eds., Science,
Morality and Feminist Theory (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1987) 111 at 113.
2 "Property in Potential Life? A Relational Approach to Choosing Legal Categories" (1993) 6
Can. J. Law & Jur. 343 at 346.
3 "Reconceiving Rights as Relationship" (1993) 1 Rev. Const. Stud. 1 at 8.
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Limits of Freedom of Contract might hold out for feminists seeking a way
out of this immediate dilemma. In particular, I consider whether
Trebilcock's demonstration of the falseness of the claim of convergence
between autonomy and welfare made by the defenders of laissez-faire
markets and contracting-the claim that autonomy and freedom to
contract must be protected because autonomy promotes welfare-sheds
light on what can be seen as the converse claim by some feminists-that
because autonomy does not promote women's well-being under
patriarchy, autonomy need not be protected Trebilcock's conclusion
that autonomy and welfare frequently diverge and therefore should be
treated as separate values, possibly pursued simultaneously rather than
chosen between, I argue, has salience for feminists and the dilemma of
choice. In particular, it holds out the possibility that the dilemma is not
so stark as feminists have seen, but rather that feminists too must pursue
parallel tracks that seek simultaneously to promote women's autonomy
and women's well-being.
II. THE DIVERGENCE OF AUTONOMY AND WELFARE
The Limits of Freedom of Contract is an exploration of two
themes. The first is the relationship between autonomy and social
welfare in a normative justification for private ordering. In exploring
this relationship, Trebilcock asks: does private ordering, the freedom to
contract, always promote the autonomy of individuals? Does private
ordering always promote social welfare measured in terms of efficiency
and/or distributive justice? In pursuing this first theme, Trebilcock has
in his sights the powerful and simple claim that animates writers such as
Richard Posner and Milton Friedman: the virtue of the market and
private ordering is that it simultaneously promotes both autonomy and
social welfare. Trebilcock's conclusion is that there are important
failures of convergence between autonomy and welfare (broadly
construed to include the full set of consequentialist goals).
This conclusion leads to Trebilcock's second question: How do
we vindicate the sometimes conflicting demands of autonomy and
welfare? Here Trebilcock argues that rather than choosing between
4 See, for example, some feminist discussions of prostitution, which conclude that prostitution
is unacceptable in an egalitarian society "because prostitution is grounded in the inequality of
domination and subjection": C. Pateman "Defending Prostitution: Charges Against Ericsson" in
C.R. Sunstein, ed., Feminism & Political Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990) 201 at
202. Implicit in a refusal to tolerate prostitution is a decision to override the prostitute's exercise of
autonomy.
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these values in the design of institutions such as private contract law and
public legislation, law should rely on different institutions to vindicate
different values. Hence, where private ordering defeats welfare goals,
Trebilcock argues that law may continue to endorse the essence of
private ordering as a vindication of autonomy values while at the same
time promoting welfare through regulation of contract terms,
distribution policies, and government investment in human capital,
communities, and the means for otherwise private delivery of social
services. In pursuing this line, Trebilcock's institutional division of labor
departs from the standard fault line economists and law and economics
scholars have traditionally drawn between matters of efficiency and
equity and the institutional solution they have recommended, namely,
leaving efficiency to the market and equity to tax and transfer systems.
Trebilcock's work is far more nuanced than this, recognizing much
beyond equity and efficiency as normative goals and grappling with the
complex ways in which the details of contract law and regulation
promote and defeat the attainment of different goals.
Feminist discomfort with, and at times hostility towards, the
discourse of contract and the market is multi-layered. At the core, I
believe, is a deeply felt concern that market relations, contract relations,
reflect an impoverished and destructive vision of human relationships.
The market and contracts, it is thought, squeeze out from human
interaction qualities of love, care, responsibility, duty, fellowship, and
community. When our obligations to one another are defined by
contract, it is feared, they are only defined by contract. Moreover, the
obligations that arise from contract are limited to those that can be
extracted quid pro quo from a self-interested separate other. There is
the further concern, raised in heightened fashion by the issues of
surrogacy, prostitution, and employment, that transactions in the market
that involve personal services or the body alienate individuals, women in
particular, from their bodies; a contract that permits a man to use a
woman's body in exchange for cash leads a woman to view her body as
separate from herself and to experience her body as in some sense the
equivalent of the cash she holds in her hand. Finally, there is the
fundamental concern raised by writers such as Jennifer Nedelsky about
the constitutive effect of different forms of legally structured
relationships on conceptions of the self and the community.
These forms of the dilemma of choice are subtle and complex;
they concern the conflict between the value of freedom and autonomy
and the impact, broadly speaking, of the institutions of the market and
contract as mechanisms for the expression of freedom and autonomy.
They are concerned with the role of these institutions in the constitution
[VOL. 33 No. 2
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and evolution of who we are as human beings, and as women. These are
complex issues of choice that I will not address here, nor are they ones
addressed by Trebilcock's work.5 What I will focus on instead is a
narrow version of the dilemma of choice that I believe Trebilcock's
analysis helps to clarify. This version of the dilemma is focused strictly
on the well-being of a particular woman who faces the possibility of
choice and can be stated as follows: if a woman is free to choose to
engage in a particular activity, we will promote her sense of autonomy
and the extent to which she is actually in control of the direction of her
life, but the circumstances of the choice make it likely or even inevitable
that the choice she makes will be harmful to her. Choice promotes her
autonomy on the one hand but diminishes her welfare on the other.
The dilemma has been posed by feminists in a number of
settings. Some feminist critics of surrogacy argue that women who
choose to enter into surrogacy agreements will contribute to their own
exploitation and the objectification of their reproductive capacities, and
will expose themselves to the risk of enormous psychological pain and
further exploitation at the hands of the courts in the event that they have
a change of heart about going through with the contract.6 Similar
5 1 am particularly interested in the idea that contract law has been seen almost exclusively by
feminists as a means of cutting off relationships, rather than as a means of building and solidifying
relationships. I am also interested in the notion, which I believe is false, that contracts are
necessarily the product of self-interested bargaining. In my view, the essence of a contract is
agreement, consensus; the source of an agreement may be love, duty, concern, obligation, eta The
problem from a feminist perspective arises when the act of agreement and contract is used to infer
self-interested bargaining and self-protection and to withdraw the state from any further role in the
assessment of obligations or relationships. In the surrogacy setting, for example, the act of
agreement to a surrogacy contract is then often used to argue that the contract must be enforced
with specific performance: see, for example; R.A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 4th ed.
(Toronto: Little, Brown, 1992) at 154. In the domestic contracting setting, the act of agreeing to a
settlement agreement is used to argue that the state has no further role in protecting the interests of
women who have signed such contracts, that the contract represents her protection of her
self-interest. See, for example, Pelech v. Pelech, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 801.
6 M.J. Radin, "Market-Inalienability" (1987) 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849 at 1930:
Whether one analogizes paid surrogacy to sale of sexual services or to baby-selling, the
underlying concerns are the same. First, there is the possibility of even further
oppression of poor or ignorant women, which must be weighed against a possible step
toward their liberation through economic gain from a new alienable entitlement. ... The
availability of the surrogacy option could create hard choices for poor women. In the
worst case, rich women, even those who are not infertile, might employ poor women to
bear children for them. It might be degrading for the surrogate to commodify her
gestational services or her baby, but she might find this preferable to her other choices in
life.
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concerns are raised with respect to prostitution 7 and access to
technologies that facilitate sex selection of fetuses.8 Family law scholars
have grappled with the dilemma of choice with respect to mediation and
separation agreements in the event of divorce, seeing risks that the
empowerment of choice in this setting will only amount to making
women the authors of their own oppression in the form of inadequate
support arrangements.9 In the criminal law, feminist legal scholars are
debating whether battered women are helped or harmed by mandatory
charging policies that take away their power to decide whether to pursue
criminal charges against their battering spouses.1 0 In each of these
cases, the promotion of a woman's capacity for autonomous choice is
poised in conflict with the promotion of her well-being.
Trebilcock's careful analysis of the relationship between
autonomy and welfare (a term he uses broadly to encompass a wide
range of measures of well-being) sheds light on this conflict between
autonomy and welfare. To begin with, Trebilcock's work validates the
discontinuity between autonomy and welfare, and unifies the feminist
critique of the convergence claim with mainstream law and economic
analysis. Autonomy, Trebilcock argues, does not always promote
well-being, as strong defenders of private ordering have claimed. The
consequences of an exercise of autonomy will depend on the
opportunities available to an individual,11 the legal treatment of initial
7IbiaL at 1922:
What if sex were fully and openly commodified? ... A change would occur in everyone's
discourse about sex, and in particular about women's sexuality. New terms would emerge
for particular gradations of market value, and new discussions would be heard of
particular abilities or qualities in terms of their market value. ... The open market might
render subconscious valuation of women (and perhaps everyone) in sexual dollar value
impossible to avoid.
8 J. Brown, "Sex selection: The ultimate sexist act" Kinesis (October 1990) 7:
Sex selection is somewhat of a thorny issue for feminism because it appears to fall within
the context of reproductive choice: why shouldn't a woman be able to choose the sex of
her baby ... ? ... For [some feminist writers] the answer is to promote awareness that sex
selection 'choice' within patriarchy serves only to reinforce patriarchal biases and
judgments and is the 'ultimate sexist act'.
9 See M. Shaffer, "Divorce Mediation: A Feminist Perspective" (1988) 46 U.T. Fac. L. Rev.
162; and B. Cossman, "A Matter of Domestic Difference: Domestic Contracts and Gender
Equality" (1990) 28 Osgoode Hall LJ. 303.
10 See D.L. Martin & J.E. Mosher, Unkept Promises: Experiences of Immigrant Women with the
Neo-Criminalzation of Wife Abuse (Faculties of Law and Social Work, University of Toronto, 1995)
[unpublished].
11 M.J Trebilcock, The Limits of Freedom of Contract (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1993) at 78-101.
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consent in light of a change in an individual's assessment of her
well-being,12 and her capacity to identify and pursue results that are in
her self-interest 3 I will consider in turn how each of these disruptions
in the relationship between autonomy and welfare relates to feminist
concerns about choice.
A. Coercion and the Scope of Choice
Trebilcock makes the strong point that autonomy and welfare
are disjoint through careful consideration of the doctrine of duress in
contract law. Here there is a conventional recognition that consent to a
transaction may fail to promote welfare when consent is extracted under
duress. The difficulty is in defining duress. Is duress limited to
paradigmatic threats of the "your money or your life" variety? Or is it
also duress for an individual to be forced into certain transactions, such
as the sale of a kidney or sexual services, because he or she lacks
alternative ways of procuring income? What Trebilcock demonstrates is
that theories of autonomy offer no self-referencing definition of duress:
we cannot identify duress solely by looking for the presence or absence
of "true" consent. Rather, in, conventional contract doctrine we judge
duress on the basis of a normative assessment of the quality of the
choices available. Objections to coerced transactions of the "your
money or your life" variety are essentially objections to the moral
baseline against which the options granted by the deal are measured. It
is not a problem of actual consent that renders extortion repugnant and
unenforceable-the robbery victim consents as vigorously as we could
imagine to the proffered option of handing over her wallet-but rather
the normative judgment that individuals are entitled to be free of threats
to their safety. This example demonstrates that we cannot assume that
autonomy and private ordering always promote welfare; nor can we
assume that failures of welfare in a system of private ordering are due to
failures of autonomy. Individual instances of autonomy and choice may
still be, and routinely are in the case of conventional duress doctrine in
contract law, assessed against a normative criterion that judges whether
the options available for choice satisfy some moral standard.
The feminist critique of autonomy with respect, for example, to
prostitution or surrogacy, is entirely of a piece with this critique by
Trebilcock of conventional claims about the relationship between
12 Ibidc at 102-46.
13 IbL at 147-63.
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autonomy and welfare. What distinguishes the conventional doctrine of
duress from the feminist argument that a woman's consent to engage in
prostitution or surrogacy does not demonstrate that these activities
improve her well-being, is where the moral baseline is drawn.
Conventional duress doctrine holds individuals to be entitled to physical
security of the person and so invalidates choices made when the scope of
choice is limited by threats to security of the person. The feminist
critique of prostitution or surrogacy holds individuals to be entitled to
some minimum level of economic well-being and so invalidates choices
made when the scope of choice is limited by economic deprivation. The
robbery victim's freedom to choose does not increase her welfare
because she was forced to choose between her money and her life; the
prostitute or surrogate's freedom to choose does not increase her
welfare because she was forced to choose between her body and her
economic survival. Trebilcock's analysis of the disjuncture between
autonomy and welfare demonstrates for feminists, then, the
conventionality and acceptance elsewhere in the law of the claim that it
is not enough that a person has consented: she must also have had
normatively acceptable options from which to choose. Enforcement of
surrogacy contracts, for example, cannot therefore be grounded in the
simple assertion that, as an instance of private ordering, surrogacy
contracts promote welfare.
B. Information Failures
One particularly fine contribution Trebilcock makes in The
Limits of Freedom of Contract, from the point of view of a law and
economics scholar, is his careful treatment of the relationship between
various definitions of efficiency and consent when there is a change in
the information or beliefs of one of the parties to a transaction between
the time of consent and the time of performance. His contribution on
this point also offers some illumination to the feminist dilemma of
choice.
Trebilcock begins with the Pareto criterion of efficiency, which
judges a transaction to be welfare-improving if it makes both parties to
the transaction at least not worse off. This is a simple and relatively
non-controversial idea. It is also thought to be the bedrock of private
ordering and the normative justification for deference to private
ordering: as expressed by Milton Friedman, "[t]he possibility of co-
ordination through voluntary co-operation rests on the elementary-yet
frequently denied-proposition that both parties to an economic
[VOL 33 NO. 2
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transaction benefit from it, provided the transaction is bi-laterally
voluntary and informed."114 The difficulty, Trebilcock emphasizes, is in
determining when the "informed" criterion is satisfied.
5 He elucidates
in this respect what he calls the "Paretian dilemma." Efforts to avoid
enforcement of a contract frequently erupt when a party's information
about the value of the contemplated trade changes. As of the later point
in time, that is, ex post the contract's formation, the trade is not
Pareto-improving; hence, the effort to withdraw consent. If we focus on
this point in time, enforcement of the contract does not promote
welfare. But there is a problem with this ex post perspective: the system
of private ordering relies on the enforcement of contracts and under this
perspective there would never be enforcement where there was
uncertainty regarding the value of a transaction. This perspective would
invalidate basic market institutions such as contracts for insurance and
stock market transactions that clearly seem to contribute to welfare.
The alternate perspective we may take is an ex ante one, judging welfare
improvements with reference to what the parties believed was in their
best interests at the time they gave their consent, even if those beliefs
turn out to be wrong. But this approach then begs the formulation of
"informed" consent: when is a belief substantiated enough to qualify as
"informed?"
The "Paretian dilemma" exposes a fundamental infirmity in the
justification for private ordering. It also illuminates the feminist
dilemma of choice insofar as the dilemma stems from concerns about
women entering into agreements without a full appreciation of the
implications of the agreement for their well-being. (This is a concern
about the exercise of choice in the surrogacy setting, for example.)
Trebilcock's Paretian dilemma demonstrates that the feminist dilemma
of choice is, again, an instance of a more general difficulty in
conventional contracts and that appeals to the problematic nature of
"informed consent" by feminists are only superficially antagonistic to
conventional contract issues. The superficiality is exposed when we
recognize that conventional contract law routinely makes normative
judgments about what is adequate consent; again, as in the case of
coercion and duress, there is no simple equation between autonomy and
welfare. In a sense, the dilemma of choice is blunted because it is so
pervasive: feminist concerns about the quality of a woman's
understanding of the implications of consent need not be framed as an
14 Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962) at 13.
15 The problem with the voluntariness criterion is dealt with above.
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assault on the concept of autonomy, need not set up a conflict with
choice. For choice routinely requires more, the law recognizes, in order
to determine when its exercise is to the good and when it is not.
C. Cognitive Incapacity and the Problem of Preferences
A final category of failures in the convergence between
autonomy and welfare,1 6 in Trebilcock's analysis, arises when individuals
are unable to recognize or act upon their own best interest. Here, it
seems to me, the feminist dilemma of choice is most sharply, but most
narrowly, posed. For here we move into consideration not of episodic
failures of autonomy to promote well-being as arise when there are
problems of coercion or information failures, but rather of systemic
failures of women to make choices that promote their well-being.
Feminists have attributed this risk to false consciousness among women
and cultural roles for women that prompt them to defer to, or act on the
basis of the interests of, others.1 7 Such a view of women's capacity for
choice thus paints a stark conflict between the promotion of autonomy
and the promotion of well-being for women.
Trebilcock deals with this type of conflict in his chapter on
paternalism, where he canvasses several views on the justification for
paternalism in the law. He considers the argument that individual
preferences are so dependent on social features external to the
individual-endowments, cultural practices, legal rules, power, etc.-that
there is no coherent sense in which a person acts autonomously when
she acts on these highly contingent, or endogenous, preferences.18 Some
16 These categories are in addition to the conventionally recognized failures due to
externalities: see Trebilcock, supra note 11 at 58-77.
17 See, for example, Shaffer, supra note 9 at 181, who suggests in the divorce mediation
context that "[u]nlike men, women may also have difficulty isolating their own needs from those of
their children, making mediation a less effective process for them" and Cossman, ibid. at 345, who
suggests with respect to separation agreements,
if women's moral specificity is such that they are not motivated by the maximization of
their self interest, but rather may, under certain circumstances, consider the interests of
others, a fundamental assumption underlying the justification for the enforcement of
contracts is undermined.... This problem is highlighted by domestic contracts which are
made in the context of intimate relationships, that is, contracts made between and
involving the individuals to whom women feel the strongest sense of responsibility-their
families-and thus for whom the sacrificing of self interest is most likely.
18 Trebilcock considers Cass Sunstein's formulation of this point in particular: see C.R.
Sunstein, "Legal Interference with Private Preferences" (1986) 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1129; Sunstein,
"Disrupting Voluntary Transactions" in J.W. Chapman & J.R. Pennock, eds., Markets and Justice
[VOL. 33 No. 2
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of his analysis captures feminist concerns about the social construction
of women's preferences, although other fundamental concerns about the
extent to which women are willing and able to act in their own interest
fall outside of this framework. In either case, however, what is valuable
for feminists in Trebilcock's discussion is not his resolution of the truth
of various claims about autonomy or the nature of preferences, but
rather the analytical move he makes to resolve the dilemma of conflicts
between autonomy and well-being.
Trebilcock transcends the sharp but narrowly conceived conflict
between choice and welfare by focusing his analysis on comparative
institutional analysis. Suppose autonomy and well-being are in
substantial conflict so we cannot place our confidence in private
ordering as a means of achieving individual well-being. Do we have
reason to believe that collective institutions, which substitute
paternalistic decisions about individual well-being for the admittedly
flawed conceptions of the individuals themselves, will do a better job of
ensuring life patterns that promote individual well-being? Will
communal institutions do a better job of recognizing and acting upon the
authentic best interests of individuals? Without necessarily accepting
Trebilcock's resolution of these questions in favour of private ordering,
the nugget of wisdom here for feminists is that the dilemma of choice is
too narrowly conceived when it is taken out of the comparative
institutional context. Failures in convergence between autonomy and
welfare are not in and of themselves sufficient to justify a rejection of
private ordering; that must rest on a considered judgment that collective
institutions will not expose women to even worse outcomes than they
would devise for themselves. The history of women's subjugation to
various forms of external authority and their exploitation at the hands of
these authorities should be reason enough for feminists to pause over
these considerations.
III. A MULTI-INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO THE
VINDICATION OF MULTIPLE VALUES
In addition to offering to feminist analysts of the dilemma of
choice an economics- and contract law-based framework for
understanding at least some of the core issues involved, The Limits of
Freedom of Contract also offers feminists some perspective on the
salience of the dilemma itself. What Trebilcock takes away from the
(New York: New York University Press, 1989) 279; and "Preferences and Politics" (1991) 20 Phil. &
Pub. Aff. 3.
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divergence between autonomy and welfare that he illuminates is not a
dilemma, but rather an agenda for the integration of multiple values in
the design of legal rules and institutions.
Trebilcock's point is this:
Too often, we confound debates about choices of values with debates about choices of
instruments. In other words, it seems important that we try to think clearly about an
appropriate institutional division of labour for vindicating these values, recognizing that
they all command legitimate adherence.1 9
Trebilcock's view is that endorsing autonomy does not imply choosing
the market over regulation or ignoring actual welfare in favour of
deference to private ordering. Nor does endorsing wealth redistribution
or the achievement of communitarian goals imply choosing regulation or
generic legislation over the market. In many cases, when close attention
is paid to the actual relationship between a particular goal such as
autonomy or welfare and a particular instrument, such as contract law, it
is possible to use a multi-pronged approach so as to vindicate multiple
values. Trebilcock refers to this approach as the "institutional division
of labour."
This multi-institutional approach may provide feminists with a
way out of the dilemma of choice. The divergence between autonomy
and welfare poses a dilemma because the issue is seen to require a
definitive choice between promoting either autonomy values or welfare
values; it is thought that the legal/institutional regime must be that which
favours one or the other. In the surrogacy setting, for example, the
question is often thought to be whether to promote autonomy, and
permit freedom of contracting in surrogacy, or to promote welfare, and
therefore to prohibit surrogacy contracts. Framed in this way, the
dilemma is stark.
But if we recognize, along with Trebilcock, that conflicts between
autonomy and welfare are in some sense routine and that it is
commonplace to require various social or communal institutions to
remediate the divergences between these two values, then feminist
dilemmas of choice take on a different cast. What becomes most
important is not a resolution of the dilemma, for there probably is not
one, but rather a detailed assessment of how various institutions might
be coordinated so as to promote both autonomy and welfare. On the
surrogacy issue, for example, Trebilcock recommends that autonomy
values be vindicated by a basic permissive stance with respect to
contracts, allowing individuals to judge for themselves the implications
1 9 Trebilcock, supra note 11 at 248.
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of these arrangements for their well-being. But he also recommends
that in the event the birth mother has a change of heart, custody reside
with her, both to mitigate the risk of emotional damage to her and to
protect the child from the harm of legal battles over custody. This
approach seeks to respond to the concern that birth mothers entering
into these contracts face tremendous difficulties in identifying and
pursuing their best interest, not by disabling their autonomy, but rather
by construing the implications of an exercise of their autonomy so as to
protect their well-being. The approach simultaneously makes a
judgment that prospective adoptive/biological parents are in a better
position to identify and pursue their best interests, even in light of a rule
that shifts to them the risk of emotional pain in the event of an error by
the birth mother. We can also imagine blending this approach with
other methods of seeking to ensure that a potential birth mother
exercises her autonomy in such a way as to truly promote her well-being
without depriving her of autonomy. Counseling, both psychological and
legal, could be mandated by government and/or offered through
community organizations. Conflicts of interest for attorneys who both
represent the commissioning parents and recruit women to act as birth
mothers could be regulated, even to the extent of prohibiting attorneys
from taking on simultaneous roles as legal counsel and recruiter.
Feminist organizations could undertake, perhaps with government
funding, to provide education to potential birth mothers and lend
assistance in their effort to determine whether and how to exercise their
power of choice. Thus, views such as that put forward by Nedelsky, that
we must look to law to help structure the relations that establish the
preconditions for truly autonomous choice, can be incorporated as part
of a multi-institutional approach rather than forming the basis for a
choice between institutions. The point is that, even for feminists who
conclude that the practice of surrogacy is ultimately damaging for all
women, there are solutions that fall short of singular prohibition and a
choice of welfare (ultimately judged by the community and not the
individual) over autonomy.
As another example of the possible reconciliations of autonomy
and welfare values, consider the issue of separation agreements
following divorce. It is possible, I believe, for women to retain the power
to enter into separation agreements, even in light of concerns that they
will frequently be led to poor agreements. This could be done by
limiting the duration of the initial agreements that divorcing couples can
reach and requiring renegotiation of the agreement after a year or two
when we might expect that the emotional difficulties that distort
women's exercise of autonomy in the agreement will have subsided
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somewhat and women will have gained a greater sense of their
autonomy from their ex-husbands. Women can also be assisted in
making decisions about separation agreements by access to advice and
counseling, public or private, and to legal rules that provide concrete
background entitlements for support. The enforcement of separation
agreements also can depart from conventional enforcement of
commercial contracts, with heightened standards for fairness via a form
of unconscionability doctrine, for example. Again the point is that we
need not be drawn into a sharp choice between private and public
ordering with respect to support arrangements by a sharply defined
conflict between autonomy and welfare in the divorce setting.
What will matter most for feminists, I believe, in addressing the
dilemma of choice is not how we will choose between autonomy and
welfare for women but how well we will do, how creative we will be, and
how willing we will be to reject received institutional truths in designing
institutions that promote both of these central values for women.
Improving women's well-being, we can hope, need not come at the
expense of transferring the power to decide for women from traditional
exploitative elites to even well-intentioned feminist elites.
IV. CONCLUSION
Much of the view that there are alternatives to the "either-or"
form of the dilemma of choice will be familiar to feminists. The value of
Trebilcock's work for feminists, I believe, is that he offers a sustained
and careful treatment of the rationale for the multi-pronged approach to
issues that present a conflict between autonomy and welfare for women.
In addition, he unifies the feminist critique of autonomy, in some
respects, with mainstream analysis based in contract doctrine and
economics. Some feminists will be uncomfortable with this alliance, no
doubt, but my own view is that the points of convergence between the
feminist critique of choice and Trebilcock's critique of the laissez-faire
convergence claim strengthen both. Trebilcock's work is enriched by the
fact that it speaks to significant feminist concerns about women's
well-being under a market system and private ordering through contract
law; feminist work is bolstered by the demonstration that simplistic
claims about the benefits of private ordering have a very weak basis in
the very world of the market and economic analysis that they purport to
inhabit and justify. Feminist critiques of choice are in no sense
consumed by Trebilcock's analysis; there is, as I remarked at the outset,
a deeper set of concerns about the impact, broadly speaking, of market
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and contract relations on the nature of being human and being female.
These concerns are not addressed by Trebilcock. But it may be that by
clarifying the terms of the dilemma of choice and-placing it in context,
Trebilcock's work offers a way out of a struggle with the narrow versions
of the dilemma and on to this broader terrain.

